What is missing from serious strategic analysis when the future is constructed almost exclusively as an extension of the present

The study Moldova’s Strategic Dilemma: EU Accession, Territorial Reintegration, and the Lessons from Cyprus is, in many respects, a competent, well-informed and useful document, but it is trapped inside a strategic universe that is too narrow for the foresight ambition it claims. The authors know the Transnistrian file, understand the mechanics of European accession, and correctly identify a range of instruments available to Chisinau: economic integration, energy dependencies, regulation, citizenship, public services, European conditionality and possible reintegration mechanisms.

The problem is not what the study analyses. The problem is what its analytical architecture almost excludes from the outset.

The document constructs three scenarios: the reintegration of Transnistria before or alongside EU accession, EU accession before reintegration, and, finally, the simultaneous blockage of both processes. It is a coherent construction, but all three variants preserve almost exactly the same geopolitical universe: the Republic of Moldova continues to exist in its current constitutional form; Ukraine continues to provide the geographical separation between Russia and Transnistria; the European Union remains the principal strategic destination; and Russia may lose or regain influence without fundamentally overturning the regional architecture. Romania remains Moldova’s close neighbour and supporter, but is not treated as a possible constitutional and security alternative, while Europe may become slower, more cautious or more Eurosceptic, but never truly retreats from the equation.

This is a perfectly legitimate basis for a public-policy study. It becomes insufficient, however, when treated as a strategic map of the future of a state located next to the most consequential European war in generations.

For serious political planning, the question is not merely how the pieces may move across the board.

We also have to ask what happens when the board and the game change.

Scenario compression: three different outcomes, the same geopolitical structure

The three scenarios are built around the relationship between two processes: accession to the European Union and the territorial reintegration of Transnistria. In some cases they advance together, in others they separate, while in the negative scenario both become blocked.

The study identifies five relevant uncertainties — European conditionality and domestic reform, the Russia–Ukraine security environment, political and social consensus, economic integration between the two banks of the Dniester, and the rise of Euroscepticism. All are important, but they primarily describe the way Moldova performs within the existing system.

Performance means asking how effectively Moldova reforms, how intelligently Chisinau uses its economic leverage over Transnistria, how successfully it negotiates with Brussels, how credibly it builds domestic consensus and how effectively it adapts its institutions.

Structure means asking what happens if Ukraine no longer plays the same strategic role, if Europe loses its appetite for enlargement, if the United States reduces its engagement in the region, if Russia radically alters its military position, or if the Republic of Moldova’s current state structure is no longer the most effective vehicle for security and European anchoring.

Ukraine and Russia: what happens when it is not only the variables that change, but the map itself?

The study recognises the evolution of the war in Ukraine as one of the key strategic uncertainties and acknowledges that Russia may preserve or expand its regional influence. The problem is that even the negative scenario remains surprisingly orderly: Russia partially restores its influence over Transnistria, gas supplies may resume, European accession becomes blocked, and Chisinau and Tiraspol gradually settle into a form of pragmatic coexistence. At a later stage, the study even leaves open the possibility of returning to a negotiating mechanism in an adapted format.

For Eastern Europe, this is almost geopolitical deterioration with good manners. Institutions continue functioning, diplomats continue negotiating, Brussels remains disappointed but present, and one day even another dialogue format may reappear.

But the real strategic question is considerably harsher.

What happens if Ukraine suffers a major military defeat and loses a significant part of its capacity to project power in the south? For the first time, even The Spectator — hardly a publication that can credibly be dismissed as harbouring Putinist sympathies — has published an article under the headline “Ukraine is losing the war.” What happens if Russia advances far enough to transform the strategic equation around Odesa, or if the space separating Russian military power from Transnistria contracts dramatically? What happens if Ukraine continues to exist as a state but can no longer perform the geopolitical function it performs today for Moldova’s security? In other words, what if its future orientation and room for manoeuvre shift much closer to Moscow?

At that point, we are no longer discussing a variation in the “security environment.”

We are discussing a different map.

And when the map changes, the strategic value of Transnistria changes with it.

At present, Chisinau’s economic leverage is real precisely because the Transnistrian region occupies an extremely constrained strategic position. The study correctly notes that the integration of Transnistrian economic operators into Moldova’s legal and economic space constitutes one of Chisinau’s principal sources of influence.

But leverage does not exist in a vacuum. An economically vulnerable enclave can, under a different military geography, become an extremely valuable strategic asset. And a state willing to absorb extraordinary economic costs in pursuit of geopolitical objectives does not automatically relinquish a strategic advantage because the customs regime becomes less convenient.

Economics matters greatly.

But security determines the price states are prepared to pay for geopolitics.

Romania: the structural scenario that should sit at the centre of the matrix, not at the edge of the conversation

The most visible omission, however, is Romania.

In 2026, the unification of the Republic of Moldova with Romania can no longer seriously be treated as a peripheral historical nostalgia. The issue has entered political discourse at the highest levels of Moldovan leadership and has been discussed by Western media specifically in relation to security, sovereignty and Moldova’s European future.

Romania therefore should not appear in such an analysis merely as an EU Member State supporting Moldova’s accession.

It should appear as a structural scenario.

If the Republic of Moldova can remain an independent, democratic and secure state, and accession to the European Union becomes irreversible within a reasonable timeframe, that is a perfectly coherent European path. But if the alternative becomes state failure, a permanently vulnerable grey zone, or a formally independent entity that is politically and strategically dominated by Russia, then union with Romania is not a doctrinal eccentricity. It becomes a rational strategic option for preserving political freedom and anchoring Moldova within the European and Euro-Atlantic space.

The fundamental issue is that statehood must not be confused with the ultimate objective of politics. The state is an instrument through which a political community protects its citizens, its political freedoms, its institutions and its capacity to decide its own future. If a particular constitutional architecture can no longer perform those functions, society is entirely entitled to consider a different architecture. Europe exist for this very reason where citizens count on a greater community to protect their future.

And the Romanian scenario alters almost every strategic variable simultaneously: EU membership, NATO, neutrality, the security regime, citizenship, Transnistria, Gagauzia, public finances, institutions, relations with Ukraine and relations with Russia.

That is precisely why it is not merely “Scenario IV.”

Europe’s strategic retreat: how you can have more European projects and less strategic Europe

There is another scenario that is subtler and therefore potentially more dangerous: Europe does not need formally to abandon Moldova for Moldova to become strategically abandoned.

The European Union may continue financing infrastructure, civil-society projects, reforms, training, visibility, consultancy and resilience programmes while the political willingness to bear the geopolitical cost of irreversibly anchoring Moldova in the West declines.

European strategic retrenchment would not necessarily resemble a dramatic rupture. Accession would formally remain the objective, but timelines would become increasingly vague; security guarantees would remain political but ambiguous; new layers of conditionality would continue to appear; Ukraine would absorb much of the available attention; the United States might prioritise other theatres; and European governments could become progressively more reluctant to absorb the costs associated with another contested eastern frontier.

Nobody would announce: “Moldova has been abandoned.” It would be like Turkey or Western Balkans.

Communiqués, financing and meetings would continue.

But at some point Chisinau could discover that the political promise still exists while the strategic power required to turn that promise into reality has diminished.

The study recommends, under its stagnation scenario, continuing reforms, maintaining judicial independence, strengthening bilateral relationships and preserving societal consensus around European integration. These are sensible recommendations, but they do not resolve the fundamental question: what happens if the problem is no longer Moldova’s performance, but the erosion of European strategic will?

Bilateral diplomacy can reinforce an existing commitment.

It cannot manufacture one that has disappeared.

Public opinion, identity and political preferences are not fixed structures. They change when perceptions of threat change. A population that favours neutrality in a relatively secure environment may come to prefer alliance protection when the threat becomes direct; a population that favours independent Moldovan statehood while EU accession appears credible may look at Romania very differently if independence becomes associated with chronic insecurity or vulnerability to Russia.

Foresight should therefore not merely model what people believe today.

It must also model the conditions that could make them think differently tomorrow.

A real strategy must answer not only the question “where do we want to be by 2035?” but also “what do we do in the first 72 hours if the strategic environment collapses?”

What mechanisms does Chisinau activate in the event of rapid military deterioration in Ukraine? Which infrastructure must be protected? What are the thresholds for requesting external assistance? How is Transnistria managed? When does the security posture change? Which political and constitutional options must be prepared in advance so that they do not have to be invented in the middle of a crisis?

Without such decision thresholds, strategy risks remaining little more than a political preference expressed in sophisticated language.

Finally, we have to ask the question institutional documents frequently postpone: what exactly are we trying to protect?

The current constitutional form of the Republic of Moldova? Territorial integrity? The lives and freedom of its citizens? Democratic institutions? The society’s capacity to remain European? The avoidance of Russian domination?

Under normal conditions, these objectives are compatible.

In an existential crisis, they may conflict.

If independent statehood came to mean permanent insecurity, institutional weakness or Russian political domination, while union with Romania offered democratic continuity, EU membership and the protection of NATO’s security architecture, the question would no longer be sentimental or symbolic.

It would become a political choice concerning the very function of the state.

And strategy exists precisely to think through such choices before circumstances impose them.

A more realistic strategic matrix should test at least eight futures

I would therefore construct a matrix that includes not merely variations in accession and reintegration, but transformations of the regional structure itself.

European Moldova would describe a scenario in which accession advances, Russian influence declines and reintegration becomes progressively more feasible.

Cyprus Moldova would envisage EU accession before the settlement of the territorial conflict, with the danger that provisional division becomes a long-term reality.

Grey-Zone Moldova would model a state in which accession stagnates, Russia recovers a substantial degree of influence and strategic autonomy must be preserved without irreversible Western anchoring.

Romanian Moldova would analyse the conditions under which the independent route toward EU membership becomes too slow or strategically inadequate, while union with Romania becomes the stronger solution for security and European integration.

A Russian breakthrough would begin with a severe Ukrainian defeat and a transformation of the military geography in the south, forcing Chisinau to respond to Russian pressure from a dramatically shorter strategic distance.

European retrenchment would test a situation in which financing and institutional presence continue but the strategic willingness to integrate and protect Moldova declines.

An imposed settlement would examine a regional agreement negotiated among larger powers in which neutrality, security status or other elements of Moldova’s future are discussed within a framework Chisinau does not control.

And a fragmentation crisis would examine a situation in which external pressure, Transnistria, Gagauzia and domestic polarisation cease to be separate vulnerabilities and combine into a systemic crisis of the state.

There is no need to attach a percentage to every scenario and pretend we can predict the future.

Foresight is not a betting shop.

Its purpose is to reveal which capabilities and options survive across multiple futures and, most importantly, which assumptions collapse first when a real shock arrives.

Institutions have a natural tendency to project the future using the vocabulary of the instruments they already understand. Development organisations see development needs, diplomats see negotiation processes, European institutions see conditionality and reform, communicators see communication problems, and civil society sees the need for participation and dialogue.

As a result, almost regardless of how serious the scenario becomes, the institutional toolkit miraculously survives: there is still stakeholder engagement, capacity building, confidence-building, consultation, facilitation, reform and eventually another international mechanism.

And if things become sufficiently complicated, we will probably organise a resilience conference as well.

It is a very human and very institutional reaction.

But it is not enough for strategy.

The genuinely useful question is the reverse:

What future would make most of our current instruments insufficient, and what must be built today so that Moldova preserves options when that future begins to materialise?

The Republic of Moldova’s true strategic dilemma is therefore not merely how to synchronise European accession with the reintegration of Transnistria.

It is broader:

Under which regional configurations can the people and institutions of the Republic of Moldova remain free, democratic, prosperous and irreversibly anchored in Europe — and which political architecture offers the best answer under each of those configurations?

In one scenario, the answer may be an independent Republic of Moldova as a Member State of the European Union.

In another, it may be a European Moldova that continues temporarily to manage territorial division.

Under a far more dangerous regional architecture, the answer may become Romania.

FES can legitimately fund a narrower question.

A state situated on the edge of a major war cannot afford to think within an equally narrow perimeter.

Because strategy does not mean merely anticipating how the pieces will be moved across the existing board.

It means being prepared for the moment when the board changes, one player withdraws, another advances, and the safest road toward Europe is no longer the one originally drawn on the map.

About the Author

Dr. Andrei Stoiciu is a senior expert in strategic communication, currently serving as Team Leader for Strategic Communication & Multilateral Public Diplomacy within the Global Gateway Strateg.. He is a long-term observer with the OSCE/ODIHR, an evaluator for European Commission People-to-People programs, author of „Influence- Architects 52 Human blueprints. Dr. Stoiciu holds a PhD in Behavioral Sciences and works as a licensed profiler and associated researcher on FIMI and information warfare, with a focus on mapping social trends, persuasion dynamics, and disruptive social games. He has also served as a trainer for law enforcement officials and prosecutors in interrogation and intelligence gathering.

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