Tiberiu Constantinescu
The meeting between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, scheduled for 19 November in Shenzhen, has all the makings of a diplomatic event whose implications extend far beyond its declared agenda. Together, the three powers possess the overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear arsenal, but the interests bringing their leaders to the same table go well beyond disarmament. The war in Iran, stalled negotiations over Ukraine and the competition for economic and strategic influence are converging at a moment when all three leaders have reasons to seek an understanding, though none is necessarily prepared to pay the price of one.
For Washington, easing tensions in the Middle East could offer the Trump administration a diplomatic way out of a conflict whose economic consequences are still being felt. Moscow wants to translate its nuclear status and control over occupied Ukrainian territory into lasting political gains. Beijing, under less immediate pressure to secure a military settlement, can afford to negotiate at its own pace, seeking to protect its trading relationships, energy supplies and strategic autonomy.
A formal agreement dividing the world into spheres of influence is difficult to envisage. More plausible is the emergence of a system of tacit understandings, under which the major powers accept certain limits on confrontation, negotiate their priorities and avoid obstructing one another on matters they regard as essential. Such an arrangement would require neither a solemn treaty nor a declaration about dividing up the world. It could begin with limited concessions, diplomatic gestures and shifts in position that, taken individually, might appear unremarkable.
There is no public evidence that such an agreement has been prepared ahead of Shenzhen. The question is whether circumstances and the interests of the three capitals have created the conditions in which one might begin to take shape.
Nuclear Disarmament Provides the Framework. Strategic Interests Give the Meeting Its Weight
Beijing officially confirmed the meeting in a 16 November announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The language chosen by Chinese diplomats was deliberately broad: discussions on world peace and the stability of relations among major powers.
At a press briefing later that day, spokesperson Mao Ning declined to confirm a detailed agenda, including when asked about Washington’s intention to raise nuclear arms control and the situation in Iran.
Beijing’s caution is deliberate. China has an interest in participating in a dialogue that affirms its status as a major power, but not in entering a diplomatic process whose outcomes have already been defined by the United States.
The nuclear question nevertheless provides a substantial starting point. With the expiry of the New START treaty in February 2026, Washington and Moscow were left without the last legally binding bilateral agreement limiting their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals. US State Department documentation shows that the treaty established not only ceilings on nuclear forces but also verification and information-sharing mechanisms. The disappearance of those constraints has further reduced transparency in an already deeply troubled military relationship.
Washington would like future negotiations to include China, whose expanding nuclear arsenal is a growing concern for American military planners. Yet the disparity between the three powers remains considerable.
According to 2026 estimates published by the Federation of American Scientists, Russia has approximately 5,420 nuclear warheads in its total inventory, the United States 5,042 and China 620. These figures cover different categories of weapons, including retired warheads, and should not be confused with the number of operationally deployed weapons. They nevertheless help explain why Beijing rejects the prospect of obligations comparable to those undertaken by Washington and Moscow.
China has little reason to accept restrictions that could entrench its numerical inferiority, particularly at a time of intensifying strategic competition with the United States. For Washington, meanwhile, a new agreement that constrained only American and Russian arsenals, without affecting the development of China’s, would become increasingly difficult to justify.
Putin has his own calculation. Nuclear negotiations offer Russia an opportunity to return to a setting in which great-power status is defined by strategic military capabilities rather than economic size or the consequences of Western sanctions. Moscow may lag far behind China and the United States economically, but it still possesses a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the Americans.
Under these circumstances, a trilateral disarmament treaty remains unlikely in the near term. A more realistic outcome would be a consultation mechanism addressing nuclear transparency, risk reduction and military communications. Even a modest achievement would have value at a time when competition to modernise nuclear arsenals is advancing faster than the mechanisms designed to restrain it.
Such an understanding could also have wider political significance. By agreeing to discuss the rules of strategic stability together, the three powers would establish a precedent for consultations on other international crises. The distance from such a precedent to an informal system for managing their rivalries remains substantial, but it is not insurmountable.
Iran and Ukraine: Two Wars That Converge in Great-Power Calculations
The war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on 28 February 2026 has exposed the limitations of a strategy based predominantly on military superiority. Strikes against Iran’s strategic infrastructure have damaged the capabilities of the authorities in Tehran, but they have neither eliminated the risk of retaliation nor brought lasting stability to the region.
The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz quickly extended the consequences of the confrontation far beyond the Middle East. The maritime passage through which a substantial share of the world’s oil and petroleum products moves became one of the conflict’s principal instruments of pressure.
The scale of the disruption is reflected in figures published by the US Energy Information Administration. Flows of crude oil and petroleum products through Hormuz fell from approximately 21.6 million barrels per day in the final quarter of 2025 to 4.9 million in the second quarter of 2026. The decline, of roughly 77%, illustrates the severity of the initial shock, although those figures do not necessarily describe maritime traffic conditions in November.
For Trump, prolonged instability carries economic and political costs. The US administration needs an arrangement that would contain the Iranian threat, allow shipping to return to normal and be presented publicly as the result of pressure exerted by Washington. The difficulty is that military success does not, in itself, provide guarantees about Tehran’s future conduct.
Russia and China could prove useful in such a process, though for different reasons.
Moscow maintains strategic ties with Iran and can influence some of the calculations underpinning Tehran’s diplomatic decisions. It does not, however, control those decisions, nor does it have any reason to sacrifice an important partner without securing something in return for facilitating American objectives.
Beijing views the conflict primarily through the prism of economic stability and energy security. China has been a major buyer of Iranian oil, and disruption to Gulf shipping routes threatens the interests of an economy heavily dependent on maritime trade.
China’s interest in reducing tensions extends beyond public statements. In its official briefing on 16 November, the Chinese Foreign Ministry outlined the diplomatic efforts of Special Envoy Zhai Jun in Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia, where he discussed possible ways of easing regional tensions.
This diplomatic activity allows China to present itself as a force for stability without aligning itself with the American military position.
There is, however, an underlying tension between Moscow’s interests and Beijing’s. Higher oil prices can benefit Russia’s energy-export revenues, while China bears the costs of more expensive imports and commercial uncertainty. Both countries would prefer to avoid major regional destabilisation, but they face different economic pressures and have different levels of willingness to intervene diplomatically.
These differences limit the prospects for a firm, common position towards Tehran. Russian and Chinese cooperation with Washington could facilitate negotiations, but it could not replace Iran’s participation in shaping a lasting settlement.
Ukraine introduces another complication. Officially, the Russia–Ukraine war is not among the subjects Washington intends to address in the trilateral format. Beijing has not confirmed an agenda that includes the conflict.
For the Kremlin, however, Ukraine remains the central strategic issue. Russia is seeking to convert its control over occupied territory into permanent political gains and to secure terms that would restrict Kyiv’s future security choices.
The US-mediated negotiations held in Abu Dhabi on 10–11 November demonstrated how difficult a compromise remains. The prospect of a large-scale prisoner exchange represents an important humanitarian outcome, but profound disagreements persist over territory, a ceasefire and security guarantees.
In statements published by the Office of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stressed the need for continued international support and European involvement in the diplomatic process. Kyiv cannot accept a settlement that would turn territorial losses into a permanent political obligation without credible guarantees for its future security.
This brings us to the most sensitive hypothesis surrounding the Shenzhen summit: that Russia might seek advantages over Ukraine in exchange for broader cooperation with Washington on other issues, including Iran.
There is no public evidence that such a bargain has been negotiated. Nor is it necessary to assume an explicit exchange in order to understand how the two conflicts might influence one another.
An easing of tensions between Washington and Moscow could change the atmosphere surrounding negotiations over Ukraine. Russia might interpret certain American gestures as signals of a willingness to compromise, while the Trump administration might regard Russian diplomatic support on another issue as grounds for reopening broader discussions.
China, for its part, would have reasons to encourage more stable relations between the other two powers without becoming a party to negotiations over Ukrainian territory.
Such a development would not necessarily imply the existence of a secret agreement. In diplomacy, concessions can emerge gradually, through changes in negotiating positions, the easing of pressure or the tacit acceptance of facts on the ground.
It is precisely this possibility that helps explain European concerns.
Europe Is Fighting to Retain Its Place at the Negotiating Table
On the day Trump, Putin and Xi are due to meet in Shenzhen, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has convened a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine in Berlin.
According to the German Federal Government’s announcement of 13 November, the meeting will focus on coordinating diplomatic efforts, post-war security guarantees and continued support for Kyiv.
The two gatherings have not officially been presented as competing events. Their coincidence nevertheless illustrates the difference between the perspective of the great powers and that of the states likely to bear the consequences of any eventual agreement.
In Shenzhen, Washington, Moscow and Beijing will discuss strategic stability and their relationships with one another. In Berlin, European leaders will seek to preserve their influence over the terms on which the war in Ukraine might be brought to an end.
For Putin, direct negotiations with the United States have obvious advantages. Russia would prefer to address the major questions of European security with Washington, NATO’s principal military power, rather than through a process in which European governments and Kyiv could substantially constrain Moscow’s options.
Europeans see matters differently. They finance a significant share of the assistance provided to Ukraine, bear the economic and military consequences of the conflict and would have to participate in any credible system of security guarantees after the war.
In remarks delivered in Dublin on 13 November, Merz emphasised Europe’s role in negotiations concerning Ukraine and the need to sustain support for Kyiv.
The concern extends beyond the possibility of an unfavourable agreement. It reflects the risk that Washington and Moscow might begin to establish political terms that would subsequently narrow Europe’s room for meaningful negotiation.
De facto recognition of Russian control over certain territories, a shift in the American position on sanctions or the acceptance of permanent restrictions on Ukraine’s security choices would have direct consequences for the entire continent.
Such decisions, however, would be difficult to implement. Kyiv would have to accept the provisions affecting it, while European countries would need to help finance and guarantee any eventual peace settlement. The United States wields considerable influence, but it cannot entirely override the will of those who would have to implement an agreement.
For Romania and other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, the consequences would be particularly significant. A change in the security balance around the Black Sea or in the guarantees provided to Ukraine would directly affect military risk assessments and Alliance planning.
The issue, therefore, is not whether Washington should engage with Moscow. Dialogue between nuclear powers is necessary, not least to reduce the risk of direct confrontation. What matters is whether the outcome respects the right of other states to participate in decisions affecting their own security.
What Each Leader Stands to Gain — and How Much Each Is Prepared to Concede
Trump arrives at the meeting with the advantage of the world’s most extensive military, financial and diplomatic instruments of influence. The United States can adjust sanctions, alter the level of support provided to Ukraine and determine the intensity of pressure applied to Iran.
American power, however, has its limits. A settlement in Ukraine that appeared to reward Russian aggression would provoke opposition in Europe and Kyiv. In Iran, a compromise lacking credible safeguards could turn the costs of military intervention into a domestic political vulnerability.
The American president needs tangible results, and that need could, paradoxically, become a negotiating weakness. Putin and Xi know that Washington would prefer to portray the summit as the beginning of a diplomatic success. That does not mean Trump would accept major concessions merely to secure such an outcome.
Putin is in an almost opposite position. Russia has considerable capacity to obstruct diplomatic progress, can prolong the war in Ukraine and can complicate Western initiatives. At the same time, sanctions, military costs and its growing economic dependence on China constrain its freedom of action.
For the Kremlin, participation in Shenzhen provides a measure of international recognition, but its objectives remain concrete: gains in Ukraine, relief from economic pressure and acceptance of a privileged Russian role in European security.
Xi Jinping does not face the same military urgency. China is economically exposed to energy instability and competition with Washington, but it does not need an immediate settlement to justify its participation in the summit.
Beijing wants to protect its access to resources and markets, avoid premature constraints on its nuclear arsenal and preserve its relationship with Russia without jeopardising the possibility of dialogue with the United States.
This position gives China a negotiating advantage. It can support efforts to reduce tensions without having to accept every American or Russian condition. It can encourage a diplomatic process while rejecting commitments that would restrict its future options.
That advantage should not be overstated, however. Beijing remains engaged in a profound strategic rivalry with Washington, while its closeness to Russia limits its credibility as a neutral mediator. The security of maritime trade routes and dependence on external markets also create vulnerabilities of its own.
None of the three leaders, therefore, possesses all the instruments necessary to impose an agreement. It is precisely this incomplete distribution of power that could favour limited compromises over a comprehensive geopolitical bargain.
Four Scenarios for What May Follow Shenzhen
The most plausible development appears to be an informal understanding on managing rivalries. The leaders could agree to continue nuclear consultations and avoid certain forms of military escalation, without signing treaties or announcing major concessions.
On Iran, such an understanding could encourage diplomatic efforts to ease tensions and protect shipping. Ukraine would remain on a separate negotiating track, although the broader atmosphere of US–Russian relations could influence those talks.
The advantage of a tacit arrangement would lie in its flexibility. The three powers could cooperate where their interests converge while preserving their disagreements elsewhere. The danger lies in the lack of transparency: a succession of informal compromises could alter international relations without the states affected knowing the full terms.
A second, more ambitious and more difficult scenario would involve a bargain across different issues. Washington could seek Moscow’s and Beijing’s cooperation in stabilising Iran, while Russia might pursue sanctions relief or a more accommodating American position towards its demands in Ukraine. China would seek assurances regarding its strategic autonomy and economic relations.
Such an agreement would have major geopolitical consequences, but it would encounter resistance from the states directly involved. Ukraine cannot simply be made the subject of a US–Russian bargain, nor can Iran be compelled to uphold a lasting settlement solely through an understanding among three other capitals. Neither Europe nor Washington’s regional allies would automatically accept compromises affecting their security.
There is also the possibility of a summit dominated by symbolism. The three leaders could part after issuing broad statements about peace, stability and nuclear responsibility, without achieving concrete progress on the conflicts.
Each would secure a political dividend. Trump could claim to have revived dialogue, Putin would gain recognition as an indispensable interlocutor, and Xi would strengthen China’s diplomatic standing.
Even such an outcome could have some value. Direct communication between rival nuclear powers reduces the risk of misinterpreting intentions. But without a negotiating timetable and verifiable measures, the summit would amount more to diplomatic repositioning than the beginning of genuine strategic change.
The least favourable scenario would be a breakdown in negotiations followed by renewed pressure. Beijing could reject any meaningful nuclear commitment, Moscow could maintain terms unacceptable to Washington and Kyiv, and the United States could judge the support offered on Iran to be insufficient.
A diplomatic failure would not automatically lead to military escalation. It could, however, reinforce each power’s conviction that its adversaries respond only to coercion, making subsequent negotiations more difficult.
Of these possibilities, a process of limited consultations appears easier to achieve than a far-reaching geopolitical bargain. Much will depend on whether the three leaders are prepared to turn immediate diplomatic advantages into concrete commitments.
Beyond the Yalta Analogy
The Shenzhen meeting inevitably invites comparisons with the great diplomatic conferences that shaped the international order after the Second World War. The image of three leaders deciding the future of entire regions evokes Yalta, but the analogy can be misleading.
In 1945, the military situation in Europe gave the Allied powers a direct ability to shape the post-war order. Today, international power is distributed far more widely. The European Union is a major economic and institutional force, India retains its strategic autonomy, and regional powers can decisively influence conflicts in their own neighbourhoods.
The United States, Russia and China can profoundly alter the global strategic environment, but they cannot fully control the responses of other actors.
More realistic than a formal division of the world is the prospect of a selective accommodation of interests. The three powers could accept certain limits on confrontation, negotiate workable economic relations and seek to avoid direct escalation in regions where their interests overlap.
Such a process could contribute to stability if it reduced nuclear risks and facilitated the resolution of conflicts. It could also undermine the principles of the international order if it turned the sovereignty of smaller states into a bargaining chip.
That distinction is fundamental to understanding the summit.
Cooperation among major powers is not inherently a threat. On the contrary, arms control and conflict prevention require dialogue between adversaries. The problem arises when security is defined exclusively in terms of avoiding confrontation among dominant powers, while the rights and interests of other states become secondary.
For Europe, an agreement to reduce nuclear risks would be beneficial. An understanding that recognised privileged Russian rights over the strategic choices of its neighbours would have the opposite effect.
The true significance of the meeting, therefore, cannot be judged by ceremonial statements. What will matter is whether the three capitals establish a credible timetable for nuclear negotiations, whether they make a tangible contribution to easing tensions over Iran, and whether changes in American and Russian positions on Ukraine preserve a meaningful role for Kyiv and its European allies.
Shenzhen could inaugurate a useful mechanism for managing rivalries among the major powers. It could remain a diplomatic success measured largely in appearances. Or it could open a less visible process in which Washington, Moscow and Beijing begin negotiating with one another over their respective freedom of action.
The difference between these outcomes will not be determined by the photograph of the three leaders, but by the concessions that emerge after the meeting — and, above all, by the states that will be asked to accept them.
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