Germany is taking a step that, until recently, its own security culture would have approached with considerable caution. The Federal Cabinet has approved a substantial expansion of the powers of the intelligence services, including the possibility of active intervention against infrastructure used by adversaries. The reform is primarily a response to hybrid threats, but it also brings a deeper issue to the surface: Berlin no longer wants to remain in a position where its security depends disproportionately on intelligence provided by its partners.
On 12 August, the Federal Cabinet approved draft legislation reforming Germany’s intelligence laws, a change described by the German Federal Government as the most extensive and far-reaching overhaul of the legal framework governing the Bundesnachrichtendienst, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, or BND, and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, its domestic intelligence service, or BfV, in the history of the Federal Republic.
This is not merely an expansion of access to data or an update of legislation for the digital age. The draft explicitly introduces what German officials describe as “operational capabilities” and “active measures”.
Under strictly regulated conditions, the services would be permitted to penetrate information systems used by adversaries, copy or delete data, and disable tools employed in cyberattacks. The BND would also be allowed to retain certain collected data for longer periods, enabling retrospective analysis when a crisis emerges.
The German Government says the objective is to enable the BND to respond more rapidly to terrorist attacks, regime changes or other crises, and to provide relevant intelligence to European partners more quickly.
Germany Moves from Observation to Intervention
This is, in fact, the change that matters.
For decades, Germany’s intelligence services operated within a far more restrictive framework than their counterparts in France, the United Kingdom or the United States. Those constraints were not accidental. They were deliberately established in the aftermath of the Nazi repressive apparatus and were later reinforced by the lessons of the Stasi surveillance system in East Germany.
Berlin now believes that this model must be adapted to the nature of the threats Germany faces.
Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt has gone so far as to argue that Germany must transform its structures into “genuine intelligence services”, equipped with effective operational capabilities. This, however, is the minister’s position in support of the reform rather than doctrinal language contained in the official draft.
According to Reuters, the new powers are designed to enable responses to sabotage, espionage, cyberattacks and other clandestine operations conducted by foreign actors.
The shift had been publicly prepared for months.
In February, BND President Martin Jaeger raised an unusually direct question for the German intelligence tradition at the Munich Security Conference: if deterrence against hybrid warfare fails, is it enough for Germany merely to observe and document, or must it also be able to take active countermeasures?
His answer was clear: the BND must become more operational. Reuters reported at the time that Jaeger linked this shift to the intensification of Russian hybrid warfare and to influence operations, sabotage and disinformation identified by German authorities.
Six months later, the Federal Cabinet turned that debate into a concrete legislative proposal.
The Reform Did Not Begin in August 2026
It would, however, be misleading to portray the change as a hasty response driven exclusively by Russia or by uncertainty in the transatlantic relationship.
Germany was already required to revise its intelligence legislation.
In 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe ruled that certain provisions governing the BND’s telecommunications surveillance of foreign nationals outside Germany violated fundamental rights guaranteed by the Basic Law. In 2024, the Court again addressed the framework governing the strategic surveillance of international communications in the context of cyber threats, once more establishing constitutional limits and proportionality requirements.
The Karlsruhe rulings therefore explain why Germany had to rewrite its intelligence legislation.
They do not, however, fully explain why Berlin chose to use that legislative overhaul to provide its services with instruments extending beyond the mere collection and analysis of intelligence.
This is where the changing strategic environment becomes decisive.
An Asymmetry Berlin Wants to Reduce
In February, Thorsten Frei, then responsible for the Federal Chancellery, acknowledged in comments cited by Reuters that several attacks against Germany had been prevented thanks to intelligence provided by allied services possessing broader powers than their German counterparts.
Frei also explained Berlin’s ambition: German intelligence services must reach “the same level” as their European partners. The rationale is pragmatic. In intelligence cooperation, he said, information is “hard currency”.
Six months later, the same concern is reflected in the presentation of the reform. Nina Warken, the federal minister responsible for coordinating the intelligence services, said that Germany was too dependent on support from the intelligence services of other states and that, in too many areas, this relationship was one-sided.
These statements point to a broader problem, even if it is not formulated as such in any single official document: in certain areas, Germany possesses fewer sovereign capabilities than the partners from whom it receives intelligence and is now seeking to reduce that asymmetry.
Warken did not speak of distancing Germany from the United States, nor did she identify Washington as the sole source of this dependence. At present, there is no evidence that the United States has structurally reduced intelligence sharing with Germany.
The issue extends beyond the bilateral relationship with Washington. A state’s value within an intelligence network depends not only on the information it receives, but also on the intelligence it is capable of producing and making available to its partners.
Russia Explains the Urgency
If Germany’s capability gap predates the current moment, Russia has accelerated the pressure to address it.
In September 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz said that the BND must attain a level commensurate with Germany’s economic weight and political responsibility in Europe. He described Europe’s security architecture as fragile and spoke of sabotage, espionage and disinformation campaigns targeting German infrastructure on an almost daily basis.
Reuters reported that Merz regarded a paradigm shift in German foreign and security policy as necessary.
In February 2026, Martin Jaeger went further, explicitly linking the need for more active intelligence services to the Russian hybrid threat. According to Reuters, German police had recorded 321 acts of sabotage during the previous year, many of which were considered likely to be connected to Russia. Moscow has consistently rejected allegations that it conducts sabotage campaigns and other hybrid operations in Europe.
The Merz government is not responding through legislation alone. The budgets of the BND and BfV increased by more than 25% in 2026, according to Reuters. Berlin is therefore combining additional financial resources, expanded powers and a more permissive approach to intervention against threats.
This is why the reform cannot be reduced to a purely legal exercise aimed at complying with the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court.
A Second Dimension of the Zeitenwende
Russia’s invasion in February 2022 forced Germany to reopen a debate it had avoided for decades: how much military power must it possess to guarantee its own security and sustain its role in Europe?
The answer was the Zeitenwende: rebuilding the Bundeswehr, increasing defence expenditure and restoring military security to the centre of German policy. The reform of the intelligence services does not constitute a new Zeitenwende. It can, however, be understood as a second dimension of the transformation that began in 2022.
Berlin appears to be accepting that military power alone is insufficient if the state remains dependent on others for a significant share of the intelligence on which its decisions must be based. Merz has already linked the two dimensions. In February, according to Reuters, the Chancellor presented the strengthening of Germany’s intelligence services as part of the broader effort to rebuild the armed forces and increase the country’s resilience.
The logic is straightforward. A state can purchase aircraft, missiles and air-defence systems. But if early warning, threat identification or a significant part of its intelligence picture consistently depends on an external partner, its decision-making autonomy remains incomplete.
Germany is beginning to close that gap.
This Is Not a Break with America
The American dimension exists, but it must be kept within the bounds supported by the evidence.
Berlin is not announcing a rupture with Washington, nor is it building an alternative to transatlantic intelligence cooperation. The new BND remains designed to exchange intelligence with allied services, while the German Government emphasises its ability to provide intelligence rapidly to European partners.
What is changing is the balance between cooperation and sovereign capability. For decades, access to American capabilities and those of other Western allies allowed Berlin to operate with intelligence services that were more constrained operationally than those of other major powers. Today, the German government is openly saying that this gap must be narrowed — not to leave the Western intelligence architecture, but to carry greater weight within it.
This is the less visible political dimension of the 12 August reform.
Germany is not attempting to replicate American, British or French capabilities overnight, nor is it abandoning intelligence sharing with its allies. It is, however, beginning to invest in a model in which dependence on the capabilities of others is reduced and its own contribution is increased.
Following its military rearmament, Berlin is therefore beginning to strengthen another component of its power: the capacity to generate more strategic intelligence through its own services and to employ new operational instruments within the strict limits established by German law.
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