President Donald Trump’s refusal to rule out a limited ground campaign in Iran marks a significant change in the nature of the conflict. The United States is no longer seeking solely to degrade Iran’s military capabilities, protect navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and impose a blockade on Iranian ports. Statements and operations over recent days suggest that Washington is also preparing the option of converting its naval and air superiority into a limited form of territorial control.
Trump has not announced an invasion, nor has he confirmed the existence of an order to deploy troops on Iranian territory. In an interview with Fox News on 14 July, however, the US president declined to rule out a limited ground campaign and stopped short of dismissing the possibility of taking control of Kharg Island.
Asked directly whether he intended to occupy the island, Trump replied that he could not disclose such information and noted that previous US strikes had deliberately avoided oil installations because of the impact their destruction could have on the global economy.
These statements come against the backdrop of a military campaign systematically targeting radars, coastal positions, air-defence systems, missile launchers, drone infrastructure and Iranian maritime capabilities. Three US officials cited by Reuters described the strikes as possible “shaping operations” — operations intended to shape the battlespace by destroying capabilities Washington would want eliminated before moving towards more complex action.
The US–Iran conflict is therefore entering a more severe phase. It is no longer merely a war of strikes and reprisals. It is becoming a confrontation over the physical control of infrastructure, islands and the routes connecting Iran to the global economy.
Trump Is Not Announcing an Invasion, but He Is Crossing a Political Threshold
The distinction between deploying troops to Iran and refusing to rule out that option remains important. Militarily, the US administration continues to preserve ambiguity. Politically, however, a threshold has been crossed.
The White House is once again discussing openly a ground component linked to a concrete objective: Kharg Island, the principal hub for Iranian oil exports.
Before the war, Kharg handled approximately 90% of Iran’s oil exports. The island lies around 26 kilometres off the mainland coast and contains terminals, pipelines, storage facilities and installations that connect Iranian oil production to external markets.
The United States has previously struck military targets on the island while avoiding its energy infrastructure. This separation between military targets and oil terminals suggests that Washington is not necessarily seeking the immediate destruction of Iran’s export capacity.
A destroyed terminal produces an economic shock but can no longer be used as a negotiating instrument. An occupied or isolated terminal can be closed, reopened or returned in exchange for concessions.
In this sense, Kharg could function as a “hostage territory”: strategic infrastructure temporarily seized in order to compel Tehran to accept conditions concerning the Strait of Hormuz, its nuclear programme, sanctions and regional security.
This is an analytical hypothesis, not a confirmed US plan. Yet the strikes against coastal defences, the public discussion surrounding the island and the expansion of the blockade together create an option that Washington appears determined, at the very least, to preserve as credible.
Seizing the Island Would Be the Easy Part. Holding It Would Mark the Beginning of the Real War
Following an intensive campaign to suppress Iranian defences, US forces could have the capacity to take Kharg. Experts consulted by Reuters warn, however, that occupying the island would expose American troops to missiles, drones, mines, uncrewed vessels and coastal artillery.
The island lies sufficiently close to the mainland for Iran to exert continuous military pressure on any potential garrison. Even if conventional defences were neutralised, Tehran could turn Kharg into a zone of attrition, forcing the United States to maintain permanent air-defence coverage, surveillance, naval support and evacuation capabilities.
Washington would take control of Iran’s principal oil outlet, but it would also assume responsibility for protecting it.
This is the difference between a strike and an occupation. An air strike ends when the aircraft leaves the operational area. Territorial control begins only after the initial assault has ended.
For the United States, the problem would not be limited to seizing the island, but would extend to defining a political objective that allowed for withdrawal. If Iran refused to make concessions, Washington would have to choose between maintaining the occupation, expanding the attacks or returning Kharg without having achieved the intended outcome.
The Real Ground Component May Begin at Sea
In the public imagination, sending troops into Iran evokes armoured columns, continental front lines and an invasion comparable to the Iraq War. At the present stage, however, this remains the least likely scenario.
A limited ground component could take the form of special-forces raids, a landing on an island, the occupation of coastal positions, the temporary securing of a terminal or the destruction of installations inaccessible to aircraft.
The United States already has units and platforms in the region suited to such missions. Personnel from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit have operated from the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli, conducted air-mobile insertion exercises and previously participated in boarding vessels suspected of violating the blockade on Iranian ports, according to information published by CENTCOM.
The line between a blockade and a ground operation is therefore thinner than it may appear.
A blockade involves identifying, stopping, redirecting, boarding and, in certain circumstances, disabling vessels. CENTCOM announced that a US aircraft had fired Hellfire missiles at the funnel of the oil tanker M/T Belma after the vessel, which was heading towards Kharg, allegedly ignored several warnings. The ship was disabled and did not continue towards Iran.
The Associated Press reported on Friday that US forces had already redirected three commercial vessels attempting to breach the blockade, disabled one vessel that failed to comply and boarded another for inspection.
This is one of the less widely recognised dimensions of the new phase: US troops do not need to advance deep into Iran for the war to acquire a ground component. They need only disembark from ships or helicopters onto Iranian territory.
The Blockade Is No Longer Aimed Solely at Isolating Iran
Donald Trump announced the reimposition of the blockade on Iranian ports on 13 July, after Washington accused Tehran of attacking commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.
CENTCOM stated that the blockade had resumed on 14 July and applied to vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports and coastal areas.
More than 20 US warships and hundreds of military aircraft were operating in the region when the mission resumed. The White House stated that more than 10,000 sailors, Marines and air personnel, two aircraft carriers and over 20 warships were participating in enforcement of the blockade.
An apparently secondary episode nevertheless demonstrated how far the new logic could extend. When announcing the blockade, Trump proposed that the United States impose a 20% levy on goods transiting the Strait of Hormuz, according to Reuters.
He abandoned the idea the following day, after discussions with Gulf leaders, stating that no one should impose a charge for passage through the strait and that economic agreements with regional partners could compensate for the US security effort, Reuters reported.
The levy was not implemented, but the political precedent remains relevant: Washington treated an international strait, even if only temporarily, as a space whose military administration could confer the right to impose economic conditions.
Beyond its military dimension, the blockade is creating a new reality. The United States is attempting to determine which vessels may reach Iranian ports, which cargoes may be carried and which routes are acceptable.
Washington is not merely seeking to halt Iranian exports. It is attempting to establish a US-controlled regime of access to the Iranian coastline.
From Defending Navigation to Striking Infrastructure
The escalation has since moved beyond the level of threats. The Associated Press reported that the United States struck bridges, electrical equipment and a surveillance tower at the port of Chabahar during the night from Thursday to Friday.
The strikes against bridges in Hormozgan Province appear to have been intended to sever the port of Bandar Abbas from the rail and road routes leading towards central Iran.
Iranian authorities also acknowledged for the first time that energy infrastructure had been attacked, without specifying whether the targets included power stations, transmission networks or other installations.
This change is fundamental. The campaign is no longer directed exclusively against capabilities that can threaten vessels in Hormuz. It is beginning to target the infrastructure that enables the movement of goods, the resupply of forces and the functioning of the Iranian economy.
Strikes against bridges do not constitute territorial occupation, but they prepare the physical isolation of coastal areas. Destroying connections between ports and the interior could reduce Iran’s capacity to move launchers, ammunition, troops and equipment towards the coastline.
Air strikes may therefore become the preparatory phase of a different operation, rather than remaining the principal instrument of the war.
The American Paradox: To Demonstrate That Hormuz Is Open, Washington Must Militarise Transit
The United States maintains that its operations are intended to preserve freedom of navigation. Yet a commercial route is not genuinely open merely because a military fleet declares it to be so.
Maritime data cited by Reuters indicate that the US presence has not restored commercial traffic. Only three cargo vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday, 16 July, the lowest daily total recorded since May.
Eleven vessels had transited the previous day, compared with a pre-war average of approximately 125 vessels per day. No very large crude carrier and no liquefied natural gas carrier passed through the strait for a second consecutive day.
This does not amount to the reopening of a commercial route, but rather to the residual functioning of a corridor dominated by risk and military coercion.
Some companies have even refused US military-guided passage, after the risk assessment for vessels was raised to “severe”, one level below the maximum, according to Reuters.
This is the fundamental asymmetry of the conflict.
The United States must demonstrate that it can protect every vessel, every day and on every route. Iran needs only to demonstrate that no vessel can be entirely secure.
Washington must provide a continuous guarantee. Tehran needs only one successful attack, one mine, one drone or one missile that penetrates the defensive systems.
This asymmetry gives Iran leverage disproportionate to its military strength. Even after the degradation of its conventional navy and coastal infrastructure, Tehran can maintain a sufficient level of risk to persuade companies, shipowners and insurers to avoid the area.
In the contest over Hormuz, commercial perceptions may matter more than declared military control.
Who Would Conduct the Ground Campaign in Place of the United States?
One of the most ambiguous elements of Trump’s statements is the suggestion that other actors could assume part of the ground campaign while the United States provided air superiority, intelligence, logistics and naval support.
The US president did not specify whether he was referring to allies, regional forces or partner units. The ambiguity may be intended to increase pressure on Tehran without committing Washington to a concrete plan.
The formulation nevertheless introduces an important strategic theme: the externalisation of ground risk.
The difficulty is that the Gulf states have few reasons to accept such a mission. Participation in the occupation of Iranian territory would turn them into direct belligerents and expose their cities, ports, oil installations, airports and desalination systems to Iranian attacks.
Iran has already demonstrated its ability to extend reprisals to states hosting US military infrastructure. In recent days, Tehran has launched attacks against targets in Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, while Jordan has announced the interception of Iranian missiles, according to the Associated Press.
A ground coalition would therefore not automatically reduce the risk. It would distribute it across the region.
Iran Is Seeking to Turn US Alliances into Vulnerabilities
The US military presence in the Gulf was established to provide security to regional partners. Iran’s strategy is attempting to reverse that relationship.
Tehran is signalling to states that host US bases that their infrastructure is becoming a target precisely because it supports Washington’s operations. The American security guarantee therefore risks being perceived simultaneously as a source of protection and as a generator of the threat.
This pressure could produce divisions without any state formally breaking its alliance with the United States. Gulf governments could restrict access to certain bases, demand consultations before operations, refuse participation in ground missions or exert pressure for negotiations to resume.
Iran does not need to defeat the US alliance. It needs only to make participation in the war sufficiently costly for each of its members.
In the event of an operation against Kharg Island, this dimension would become critical. US forces would require bases, air corridors, refuelling, medical evacuation, logistical support and missile defence.
Each element would bind the regional states more closely to the conflict.
Bab el-Mandeb: A Second Maritime Front Is No Longer Merely Hypothetical
The threat of extending pressure towards Bab el-Mandeb has become more concrete. According to three sources cited by Reuters, Iran asked Yemen’s Houthi movement to prepare to close the maritime route at the entrance to the Red Sea if the United States attacked Iranian energy infrastructure.
A source close to the movement stated that missiles and drones had been deployed near the strait and that Houthi forces were awaiting the order to act.
According to the same source, representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Yemen would control the decision on the timing of the operation. Iran’s Foreign Ministry and Houthi representatives did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment.
The architecture of this mechanism warrants attention. Iran does not need to announce the closure of Bab el-Mandeb directly. It can establish a mechanism through which pressure on maritime traffic is applied by a formally separate actor in response to a political signal from Tehran.
It is a form of deterrence by delegation: the operational cost falls on the Houthi movement, the strategic decision remains connected to Iran, and responsibility can be contested in legal and political terms.
If this mechanism is activated, Washington would no longer face a single maritime crisis, but two simultaneously active chokepoints: Hormuz, at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and Bab el-Mandeb, at the entrance to the Red Sea.
Before the war, approximately one-fifth of global energy flows passed through Hormuz. Following the redirection of part of the Gulf’s exports towards the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb now carries approximately 7% of global energy flows.
Saudi Arabia has directed a significant share of its exports towards the port of Yanbu, turning the alternative route into a new vulnerability.
The United States would have to divide ships, aircraft, defensive systems and surveillance resources between two theatres. Shipping companies would lose both the Gulf energy route and the commercial corridor leading to the Suez Canal.
An even greater proportion of traffic would be redirected around Africa, increasing costs and extending delivery times.
Control of Kharg would not automatically solve this problem. The United States could take control of Iran’s principal oil terminal without eliminating Tehran’s ability to disrupt navigation from other parts of its territory or through regional allies.
Iranian leverage over maritime routes no longer depends exclusively on Iran’s coastline.
Escalation and Negotiation Are Advancing Along the Same Corridor
The pace of operations confirms the transition to a more intensive phase. CENTCOM announced the completion of a sixth consecutive night of strikes, while Iran continued missile and drone attacks against US targets and regional allies.
At the same time, both sides are sending contradictory signals. Trump presented the alleged release of an American woman detained in Iran as a gesture of goodwill, but Iranian judicial authorities denied that any release or prisoner exchange had taken place, according to Reuters.
This overlap between military strikes and diplomatic signals is not accidental. Washington is attempting to increase pressure ahead of possible negotiations, while Tehran is seeking to demonstrate that escalation has not diminished its capacity to impose regional and global costs.
The problem is that each round of attacks changes the terms of a potential agreement. Following strikes on bridges, electrical infrastructure and ports, Iran is no longer negotiating solely over Hormuz and its nuclear programme, but also over reconstruction, security guarantees and an end to attacks on its territory.
The stronger the pressure becomes, the more complex the agreement required to stop the conflict will be.
The Military Clock and the Constitutional Clock Are Beginning to Overlap
On 10 July, Donald Trump submitted formal notification to Congress concerning the resumption of hostilities, stating that military operations had resumed on 7 July following Iranian attacks against commercial vessels.
The administration considers that the notification opens a new 60-day period during which the president may use military force without additional congressional authorisation, according to Reuters.
This interpretation is contested by Democratic and Republican lawmakers, who argue that the ceasefire did not automatically reset the deadline that began with the attacks in February.
Both chambers of Congress had already adopted a resolution calling on the president to withdraw US forces from hostilities with Iran.
An air campaign can more easily be maintained within an area of legal and political ambiguity. The occupation of Iranian territory would make it considerably more difficult to sustain the argument that the United States was conducting only a limited operation to protect navigation.
Domestic political pressure is intensified by public perceptions of the war. A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted in March found that 65% of Americans expected Trump to send troops into a large-scale ground war, but only 7% supported such a scenario.
A July Reuters/Ipsos poll found that 79% of respondents expected a prolonged war, while only 18% believed it would end quickly.
Trump possesses military superiority, but he does not have unlimited political time.
Publicly Announcing the Objective May Weaken the Military Advantage
There is also an operational paradox in the US president’s statements.
Publicly discussing Kharg Island increases psychological pressure on Iran and demonstrates that no strategic target lies beyond the reach of the United States. At the same time, it gives Tehran time to prepare.
Iran can disperse launchers, move drones towards the coast, mine approach routes and prepare successive attacks against forces attempting to occupy the island.
An amphibious operation requires surprise, operational security and discreet preparation. The more explicit the threat becomes, the more Iran can transform Kharg from a strategic vulnerability into a zone of attrition.
Unpredictability can be a political instrument. In military planning, however, publicly announced objectives carry a cost.
The Objective Is No Longer Regime Change, but Control of the Nodes of Iranian Power
An invasion of Iran in its entirety would require hundreds of thousands of troops, vast logistical resources and the acceptance of a war in a country more than four times the size of Iraq.
Nothing in the current deployment indicates preparations for such an occupation.
The strategy appears closer to a form of selective control over the strategic nodes of the Iranian state.
Washington could seek to isolate oil terminals, neutralise coastal systems, destroy nuclear infrastructure, restrict access to ports and reduce the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ freedom of action without occupying Iran’s major cities.
This would be a campaign to control the mechanisms through which Iran projects power, rather than to administer the entire state.
The risk is that Tehran will not interpret the distinction in the same way. Washington may present the occupation of a single island as a limited operation, but Iran would perceive it as an occupation, an attack on its sovereignty and the possible beginning of a policy of territorial fragmentation.
From that point onwards, the conflict would acquire an existential dimension for the Iranian leadership. The space for compromise could narrow precisely as US military pressure reached its highest level.
The Problem Military Superiority Cannot Solve
The United States can destroy a significant part of Iran’s conventional capabilities. It can intercept vessels, impose a blockade, occupy an island and strike installations deep inside the country.
Military success, however, does not automatically answer the fundamental political question: what must Iran accept for the United States to end the war and leave any territory it may have occupied?
If the objective is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, what mechanism will guarantee that Iran does not obstruct navigation again after a US withdrawal?
If the objective is to control the nuclear programme, who will inspect the installations, and what will happen to the remaining nuclear material?
If the objective is to weaken the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who will administer the security of the ports and coastline after the strikes end?
If Kharg is occupied, under what conditions will it be returned?
These questions define the new phase of the conflict more clearly than the number of aircraft, ships or missiles being used.
Trump is attempting to convert US military superiority into negotiating power. Yet by introducing troops and territorial control, Washington risks transforming temporary leverage into an open-ended obligation.
A War over the Right to Set the Rules
The US–Iran conflict is no longer solely about the nuclear programme, sanctions or attacks on commercial vessels. It is increasingly a confrontation over the right to establish the rules in one of the world’s most important maritime spaces.
Iran maintains that its geographical position gives it the capacity to control the Strait of Hormuz and to play a role in managing traffic through it.
The United States argues that navigation must remain free, while simultaneously imposing a blockade on Iranian ports and determining which vessels may reach Iran’s coastline.
Tehran is attempting to determine who may pass through the strait and under what conditions. Washington is attempting to determine who may use Iranian ports. Commercial vessels are caught between these two systems of coercion.
The possible deployment of troops would represent a transition from control exercised at a distance to the physical control of territory.
This is the true strategic change produced by Donald Trump’s statements. The US president is not merely threatening to strike Iran more forcefully. He is suggesting that the United States could begin temporarily taking control of its infrastructure, islands and access points to the global economy.
Washington could rapidly prevail in an operation against an isolated objective. What remains unproven is whether it could convert that victory into a stable agreement without being compelled to remain in order to defend it.
In the new phase of the war, the question is no longer whether the United States can enter Iranian territory.
The question is under what conditions it will be able to leave.
Read also
