Spain’s case reveals the Alliance’s new rule: America’s guarantee will increasingly be tied to access, capability, and reciprocity
The crisis opened by reports of an internal Pentagon email is not, in essence, a crisis about Spain. It is a broader test for NATO: can the Alliance remain credible if the United States requests operational support for a war that is not a NATO operation, while some European allies refuse access to bases, overflight rights or logistical involvement?
This is the central question. Not whether Madrid has the legal right to refuse. It does. Not whether Washington has the political right to be dissatisfied. It does. The real issue is what happens to a military alliance when the security guarantee, operational access and international legality no longer automatically move in the same direction.
According to Reuters, an internal Pentagon email reportedly included options for sanctioning NATO allies deemed insufficiently cooperative in the war with Iran. Among the options discussed were suspending Spain from NATO and reassessing the US position on the Falkland Islands, in response to the stance taken by some allies toward American requests for access, basing and overflight — the military formula known as ABO.
The operational context is essential. Operation Epic Fury, which began on 28 February 2026, is an American military campaign in the war with Iran, carried out in support of Israel, not a NATO operation. Reuters notes that the State Department’s top legal adviser defended the campaign as an act of self-defence and protection of Israel, while more than 100 international law experts condemned the war as a violation of the UN Charter, citing the absence of an imminent threat and the impact on civilians. This is the point that balances the entire analysis: the American request for operational support may have strategic logic, but the legality and mandate of the operation remain contested.
This distinction fundamentally changes the analysis. Had this been a matter of Article 5, an ally’s refusal would have carried a different weight. But here the discussion concerns a military campaign outside NATO’s formal framework. For that reason, the dispute cannot be reduced to a simple formula: loyal allies versus disloyal allies. It is about the boundary between strategic reciprocity and sovereign decision-making.
The American argument: those who ask for protection must deliver in a crisis
Washington’s position cannot be treated as mere unilateral pressure. The United States remains the principal military guarantor of European security, while the eastern flank depends directly on American presence, infrastructure, capabilities and deterrence. In this logic, the American administration has a real strategic argument: an alliance cannot function if some members rely on US protection against Russia but refuse operational support when Washington requests assistance in a major crisis.
Associated Press reports that Pentagon spokeswoman Kingsley Wilson said NATO allies “were not there for us” and that the Pentagon would provide the president with credible options so that allies are no longer “a paper tiger”, but do their part.
This is the American logic in its hardest form: NATO should not be merely a mechanism through which Europe receives security guarantees, but also a structure in which allies become useful to the United States when Washington needs access, logistical support and political capacity to respond. This is not an argument without foundation. An alliance without reciprocity risks becoming, in the eyes of its main guarantor, an imbalanced relationship.
But the American argument has a limit. Reciprocity cannot automatically turn every American operation into an allied obligation. If NATO were to function in this way, the distinction between collective defence and participation in US-led wars would become dangerously blurred.
The reluctant allies’ argument: sovereignty is not desertion
Spain has not challenged NATO and has not announced any distancing from the Alliance. Madrid refused the use of its bases and airspace for operations related to Iran, invoking international legality. Associated Press notes that Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said the Spanish government works with official documents and stated positions, not emails, and that Spain offers cooperation to allies “always within the framework of international legality”.
This is not a secondary nuance. NATO has no direct role in the war with Iran, and the founding treaty does not automatically oblige a member state to provide bases or overflight rights for an operation that does not belong to the Alliance. Associated Press underlines that NATO operates by consensus, that the treaty contains no mechanism for suspending or expelling members, and that the organisation has no direct role in the war with Iran, apart from defending its own territory.
Spain’s refusal can therefore be legal and still politically costly. A state may have the right to refuse, while the United States may regard that refusal as a sign of weak partnership. Sovereign rights do not eliminate strategic consequences. But neither does American dissatisfaction cancel sovereign rights.
The case is not limited to Spain. Reuters reported that Italy refused permission for American military aircraft to use the Sigonella base in Sicily for operations in the Middle East, citing the absence of prior authorisation from the government in Rome. The operational effect remains the same: American access can no longer be assumed automatically.
Germany did not enter the same register of bases and overflight rights, but its diplomatic positioning reflected the same caution regarding escalation. At the European summit in Cyprus, Chancellor Friedrich Merz proposed a gradual easing of sanctions against Iran as part of a peace agreement, while other European leaders urged restraint — according to Reuters.
The United Kingdom, the Falklands file and the limits of pressure between allies
The United Kingdom is the second major file in this crisis, not a side issue. If Spain raises the question of suspension from NATO, the British case raises an even more sensitive question: can Washington use its diplomatic position on a sovereignty file to pressure a traditional ally?
Reuters reported that a spokesperson for Prime Minister Keir Starmer reaffirmed that sovereignty over the Falkland Islands rests with the United Kingdom and that the islanders’ right to self-determination is “paramount”, after the internal Pentagon email reportedly suggested reassessing the US position on the issue as a form of pressure over London’s stance on the war with Iran.
The episode shows that the tension is not peripheral or limited to a southern European state. It also touches the relationship with the United Kingdom, one of the United States’ closest military allies. If Washington is prepared to consider symbolic pressure instruments on sovereignty files, the message sent to the Alliance is broader: American support is no longer a neutral diplomatic resource, but an instrument conditioned by cooperation.
This is where the structural risk for NATO emerges. Pressure can discipline allies, but it can also erode trust. An alliance does not function through power alone, but through predictability. If allies come to believe that operational disagreements may trigger sanctions on sovereignty files, political cohesion weakens, even if the treaty remains intact.
Suspending Spain: legal impossibility, political weapon
From a legal standpoint, suspending Spain from NATO appears very difficult to sustain. Associated Press cites NATO’s position that the founding treaty contains no mechanism for suspending or expelling a member. The Alliance operates by consensus, and all 32 member states must agree for NATO to act.
The absence of a formal procedure does not, however, make the threat irrelevant. In security politics, the purpose of such a formulation is not immediate legal application, but political effect. The threat of suspension signals that refusal of access will not be treated as a neutral gesture. Reuters indicates that the email aimed, among other things, to reduce what the American official described as Europeans’ “sense of entitlement” — a formulation that shifts the dispute from the technical realm of military access to the realm of mutual political perception.
This is, ultimately, the real stake. If the American administration comes to believe that European allies treat US protection as a cost-free entitlement, pressure on NATO will increase. If European allies come to perceive American requests as automatic access for wars that are not NATO operations, domestic political resistance will grow. NATO stands precisely between these two perceptions, and the distance between them is now measured in concrete decisions, not summit declarations.
Romania: useful ally, not propaganda trophy
Romania enters this file not as a moral example, but as a strategic case study. Bucharest chose a different line from Spain, Italy or the United Kingdom: it rapidly accepted the American request to use the Mihail Kogălniceanu base in the context of Operation Epic Fury.
Stars and Stripes reported that the United States received permission to use bases in Romania for operations related to Iran, after a meeting of defence officials in Bucharest, and that President Nicușor Dan convened the Supreme Council of National Defence to discuss the American request.
CEPA added context: the decision on Mihail Kogălniceanu was adopted in less than 24 hours, through the convening of the Supreme Council of National Defence and parliamentary approval on the same day. CEPA’s analysis underlines that the decision also had domestic political costs, including opposition from AUR and POT, which cited the lack of guarantees regarding the strictly defensive character of the equipment and the protection of the base.
This dimension is essential. Romania should not be presented as NATO’s “model pupil”, but as a state that made a pro-American strategic choice at a moment of tension. The choice strengthened its profile in Washington, but it also produced legitimate internal questions about risk, guarantees and the level of involvement in a war that is not a NATO operation.
The statements made by US Ambassador Darryl Nirenberg to Digi24 must be read in this key: not as an independent assessment, but as the official American position on Romania. He stated that the US commitment to NATO and Article 5 remains firm, pointed to the Mihail Kogălniceanu base as an example of NATO “in action”, and said that Romania had proved itself “a true partner” through rapid and decisive responses regarding Epic Fury.
For Washington, Romania offers what is becoming increasingly important in NATO: geography, military infrastructure, access, rapid reaction and political availability. For Bucharest, this positioning is an opportunity, but also a form of exposure. A useful ally is an appreciated ally, but also an ally that will be asked for more, more often.
The eastern flank and Romania’s real dilemma
For Romania, Poland and the Baltic states, the stakes of this crisis differ from those of Spain or Italy. The eastern flank cannot afford an ambiguous NATO or one marked by mistrust between Washington and European capitals. In the face of Russia, the American guarantee remains the central element of deterrence.
For this reason, Romania has an interest in a solid transatlantic relationship, not in a Europe that imitates autonomy without real military capabilities. At the same time, Bucharest cannot automatically treat every American request as a strategic obligation without its own assessment. The difference between a credible ally and an actor without discernment remains important.
CEPA notes that former Supreme Allied Commander Philip Breedlove described the Mihail Kogălniceanu base as “incredibly important for anything we do” in the Middle East. It is precisely this importance that raises legitimate political questions: what does Romania receive in exchange for its strategic utility? A more robust and predictable American presence? An updated US strategy for the Black Sea? Clearer guarantees regarding the protection of infrastructure used for external operations? These are not anti-American questions. They are the normal questions of a state located on the contact line of Euro-Atlantic security.
The question NATO can no longer avoid
The central dilemma is this: is it justified for the United States to request access to bases, overflight rights and logistical support for an offensive military operation that has not been triggered under Article 5?
The answer cannot be absolute. From Washington’s perspective, yes — if European allies benefit from American protection and if the operation targets an adversary that threatens the interests of the United States and its partners. From the perspective of reluctant allies, no — if the operation is not approved by NATO, is not based on an attack against a member state, and raises serious questions of international legality.
The fact that more than 100 international law experts characterised the war as a violation of the UN Charter is not a footnote. It is the legal argument that explains why the refusal of some allies cannot be reduced to lack of loyalty. Reuters notes this legal opposition alongside the official American argument regarding self-defence and the protection of Israel.
This is the tension that will define NATO in the coming years: the relationship between the American guarantee and the willingness of allies to provide access in crises that are not strictly NATO crises. Not defence spending alone. Not declarations of loyalty. But the concrete question: who delivers when Washington asks for support, under what conditions and with what mandate?
The United States will increasingly ask allies to be useful, not merely declaratively aligned. European allies will increasingly invoke sovereignty and legality when American operations are not collectively assumed. Between these two positions, NATO’s credibility will be decided. For the eastern flank, this shift is not theory. It is the concrete architecture of regional security.
