The race for the quantum computer is often framed as a laboratory competition, driven by spectacular figures, corporate announcements and promises of technological revolution. Yet such a reading is far too narrow for the true stakes of the issue. In 2026, quantum computing is no longer merely a scientific frontier; it has become a fully fledged strategic dossier, in which major states, economic blocs and large corporations are seeking to position themselves before the technology reaches full maturity. That is precisely why the fact that the race is still wide open is not a secondary detail, but the key to the entire story: no one has won yet, and it is precisely this uncertainty that makes the competition more intense, more costly and more geopolitical.
At its core, this is not a classic, linear race in which one actor is clearly ahead and the others are simply trying to catch up. OECD shows that, by November 2025, 18 OECD member states plus the European Union had adopted dedicated quantum technology strategies. The OECD also notes that, by October 2025, governments worldwide had committed approximately $55.7 billion to quantum science and technology since 2013. These figures make it clear that quantum computing has long since moved beyond the realm of exotic research and into the sphere of industrial policy, strategic planning and technological security.
Why the Race Remains Open
The principal reason why the competition remains open lies in the nature of the technology itself. There is still no single, dominant and uncontested model. Different companies and research centres are pursuing distinct architectures, each with different trade-offs between stability, error correction, scalability and cost. In other words, we still do not know not only who will win, but even what kind of system will ultimately define victory.
Here lies the first major difference between quantum computing and other recent technological races. In artificial intelligence, leaders have begun to emerge with relative clarity. In quantum, the picture remains far more fluid. McKinsey indicates that the combined market for the principal quantum technologies — quantum computing, quantum communication and quantum sensing — could reach as much as $97 billion globally by 2035, with quantum computing accounting for the largest share of that value, estimated at between $28 billion and $72 billion. This does not mean that the strategic verdict has already been delivered. On the contrary, it means that multiple players still believe there is time to secure decisive positions.
Hence the temptation to reduce everything to a contest of announcements: who has added more qubits, who has published another paper, who has promised to achieve “quantum advantage” first. Yet this pursuit of records risks missing the central question: not who impresses first, but who first turns research into exploitable strategic capability.
The Real Stakes: The Power Infrastructure of the 21st Century
The real stakes in quantum computing are not academic prestige, but control over future infrastructures of power. If the technology matures at meaningful scale, its impact will not be confined to a single sector. It will affect cybersecurity, industrial simulation, advanced materials development, computational chemistry, finance and logistics optimisation simultaneously. McKinsey estimates that, in the financial sector alone, the economic potential could range between $400 billion and $600 billion by 2035 — a sign that the issue can no longer be viewed solely through the lens of the laboratory.
For states, the implications are greater still. Whoever first achieves a functional and scalable quantum ecosystem may secure simultaneous advantages in the economy, defence, intelligence and technological autonomy. That is why the race is strategic even before the technology reaches full maturity. Governments are not merely investing in a scientific wager. They are investing in a possible redistribution of global influence.
This is precisely why the issue cannot be treated as a simple technology story. It must be read as part of the new competition for power between the United States, China and, in a more ambiguous position, Europe. The United States benefits from an exceptionally dynamic private ecosystem and from the close connection between universities, companies and the state. China has the capacity for centralised strategic mobilisation and a state logic that treats emerging technologies as instruments of power projection. Europe, by contrast, possesses scientific excellence and serious research capacity, but risks remaining in the familiar position of an actor that produces ideas and specialists without fully controlling industrial scaling and strategic monetisation. The OECD describes precisely this proliferation of strategies and public instruments as evidence of a competition that has become systemic.
The Race Has Already Begun: Today’s Data, Tomorrow’s Vulnerability
There is, however, an even more serious dimension, one that shifts the discussion from anticipation to urgency. Even though no quantum computer yet exists that is powerful enough to break current encryption standards at scale, security authorities already treat the risk as a real one. NIST explicitly explains the logic of “harvest now, decrypt later”: an adversary can intercept and store encrypted data today, even if it cannot yet be read, in the expectation that it may be decrypted in the future once quantum capabilities mature.
This idea radically changes the perspective. The strategic contest does not require the arrival of “day zero,” when the decisive quantum computer finally appears. It begins the moment sensitive data with long-term value becomes worth capturing and storing. Diplomatic communications, military information, advanced research, intellectual property, financial data and critical infrastructure can all become targets in a race that is already being waged out of public sight. NIST makes clear that some secrets remain valuable for many years, which is precisely why the transition to post-quantum cryptography must begin as early as possible. In the same vein, the technical document NIST IR 8547 describes the post-quantum threat as a pressing one even before the emergence of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.
The additional shock lies in the fact that estimates of the threat timeline appear to be compressing. Nature reported in early April 2026 that two new analyses suggest that certain widely used security keys and even cryptocurrencies could become vulnerable before the end of the decade, earlier than more cautious scenarios had previously assumed. This does not mean that a rupture is imminent tomorrow morning. It does mean, however, that the comfort zone in which the world could afford to believe this problem belonged to a distant future is beginning to narrow.
Europe Risks Playing Below the Weight of History
For Europe, this dossier is particularly sensitive. The continent has scientific competence, strong institutes and substantial research capacity, but the question remains the same as in other technological domains: can it turn this foundation into genuine technological sovereignty? Can it create industrial champions, supply chains, large-scale investment and its own standards? Or will it once again finance the research phase, only for the commercial and strategic advantage to be captured elsewhere?
This is one of the most important interpretive keys for the European audience. If Europe treats quantum merely as an innovation file, it risks falling behind. If it treats it as a matter of strategic autonomy, then it begins to understand the real stakes. The OECD makes clear that national strategies and public policies in this field are driven not only by economic benefits, but also by strategic objectives, including technological leadership and risk management.
What Will Truly Decide the Winner of the Quantum Race
In quantum computing, the relevant question is no longer whether the world has entered a strategic race, but who will be the first to convert technological uncertainty into concrete power. The race remains open. But the fact that it remains open does not mean that it is abstract or distant. It means precisely the opposite: that investment, repositioning and defensive preparation are already under way, before the broader public can even see the decisive moment.
The real lesson is this: in the quantum domain, victory will not necessarily belong to the actor that first announces a technological miracle, but to the one that first understands that the power of the future is built years before it becomes visible. In that respect, the race for the quantum computer no longer belongs only to the future. It is already part of the present.
